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Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, 139 S. Ct. 1894 (2019) 
Nyles G. Greer  
 
The Supreme Court of the United States recently ruled that the 
Atomic Energy Act did not preempt a Virginia law prohibiting uranium 
mining in the Commonwealth. The Court held that although the Act 
delegated substantial power over the nuclear life cycle to the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, it offered no indication that Congress sought to 
strip states of their traditional power to regulate mining on private lands 
within their borders. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, the Supreme Court ruled that 
a state law could prohibit uranium mining on private land despite federal 
regulations addressing other aspects of the uranium industry.1 Seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief, petitioner Virginia Uranium, Inc. 
(“Virginia Uranium”) initially sued the Commonwealth of Virginia 
(“Commonwealth”), arguing that the Atomic Energy Act (“AEA”) 
preempted Virginia law under the United States Constitution’s Supremacy 
Clause.2 Virginia Uranium averred that the AEA dictated the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (“NRC”) as the sole regulator in the field, and 
because the NRC’s regulations did not mention uranium mining, Virginia 
Uranium could mine uranium in Virginia.3 The Court rejected this 
argument, however, finding that the AEA did not preempt state laws that 
prohibit mining on private lands within their borders.4  
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Virginia Uranium sought to mine uranium from a site in Virginia 
using conventional extraction methods.5 The company intended to mill the 
uranium ore at the mine site, with the end goal of selling the pure uranium 
to enrichment facilities.6 However, Virginia law prohibited uranium 
mining on private lands within the Commonwealth.7 In an attempt to 
challenge the law, Virginia Uranium filed suit in U.S. District Court for 
the Western District of Virginia.8 The District Court granted summary 
judgment for the Commonwealth, finding that the AEA did not preempt 
 
1. 139 S. Ct. 1894 (2019).  
2.  Id. at 1901.  
3. Id.  
4. Id. at 1909.  
5. Id. at 1900.  
6. Id.  
7. Id. at 1901; see VA. CODE ANN. §§ 45.1–161.292:30, 45.1–283 
(2013).   
8. Virginia Uranium, 139 S. Ct. at 1901.  
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the Virginia law.9 Virginia Uranium appealed and the Fourth Circuit 
affirmed.10 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether 
Congress intended to eliminate states’ regulatory power over mining on 
private lands through the AEA.11 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
A.  The AEA Did Not Preempt State Law 
 
The Court first addressed Virginia Uranium’s argument that the 
AEA granted the NRC sole authority to regulate uranium mining for the 
purpose of addressing nuclear safety concerns.12 The Court was quick to 
note that “[u]nlike many federal statutes, the AEA contain[ed] no 
provision preempting state law.”13 In addition, the Court specified that 
while the AEA provided the NRC with authority to regulate most areas of 
the nuclear fuel life cycle, it did not address mining.14 Although mining 
companies must abide by the NRC’s regulations in most contexts of 
uranium mining, this regulatory power begins “after [uranium’s] removal 
from its place of deposit in nature.”15 Accordingly, the Court determined 
the NRC’s power vested after nuclear material is mined.16 
The Court noted that the AEA as a whole supported this 
contention because it addressed mining in the context of a narrow 
exception.17 The Act provided that “[o]n federal lands . . . the NRC may 
regulate uranium mining.”18 Accordingly, the Court found that Congress 
had directly spoken to the issue, “and every bit of what it[] said indicates 
that the state authority remains untouched.”19  
Moreover, the Court observed that Congress added a provision to 
the AEA which allowed the NRC to give states some of its regulatory 
powers, provided the NRC retained control over sensitive activities such 
as “construction of nuclear power plants.”20 Virginia Uranium suggested 
 
9.  Id. at 1901; see Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. McAuliffe, 147 F. Supp. 3d 
462 (W.D. Va. 2015).  
10.  Virginia Uranium, 139 S. Ct. at 1901; see Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. 
Warren, 848 F.3d 590, 593–94 (4th Cir. 2017).  
11.  Virginia Uranium, 139 S. Ct. at 1901.  
12. Id.  
13. Id. at 1902 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).   
14.  The “nuclear fuel life cycle” is the cycle nuclear material undergoes 
from the beginning process of mining, to its use as a power source, and its subsequence 
storage after use. Id.   
15. Id. (emphasis in original) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2092 (2012)).  
16. Id. (citing Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 14; In re Hydro 
Resources, Inc., 63 N.R.C. 510, 512 (2006)). 
17. Id. 
18. Id. (emphasis in original) (citing 42 U.S.C § 2097).  
19. Id.  
20. The court stated that “the NRC may now, by agreement, pass to the 
States some of its preexisting authorities to regulate various nuclear materials ‘for the 
protections of the public health and safety from radiation hazards.’” Id. (citing 42 
U.S.C § 2021(c), (b)).  
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the added provision expanded the preemptive nature of the AEA and 
“demand[ed] the displacement of any state law (touching on mining or any 
other subject) if that law was enacted for the purpose of protecting the 
public against ‘radiation hazards.’”21 In the Court’s view, however, 
Congress added the subsection in question, 42 U.S.C §2021(k), to guide 
courts, similar to a “non-preemption clause.”22 Reading the statute as 
Virginia Uranium suggested would “turn the provision on its head[,]” and 
lead to an impermissible result because both the state and the NRC would 
lack authority to regulate uranium mining for radiation safety.23 Therefore, 
the Court concluded that the subsection did not “displace traditional state 
regulation over mining or otherwise extend the NRC’s grasp to matters 
previously beyond its control.”24  
 
B.  The Court Has Not Adopted A Different Reading of the AEA 
 
Virginia Uranium additionally argued that prior Court precedent 
adopted an alternative reading of the AEA.25 In Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. 
State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n,26 the Court found a 
preemption challenge to a California law prohibiting the construction of 
nuclear power plants untenable.27 Virginia Uranium argued that Pacific 
Gas upheld the state law at issue because the legislature enacted the statute 
to address economic development.28 Accordingly, “any state law enacted 
with the purpose of addressing nuclear hazards must fall thanks to [the 
Court’s] precedent.”29 The Court rejected this argument, stating that 
Pacific Gas dismissed the idea that the federal government enjoyed the 
sole regulatory power over all nuclear matters.30 In addition, the Court 
determined that none of the holdings in Pacific Gas were applicable or 
persuasive.31 The Court explained that regulating nuclear power plant 
construction is one area that the NRC has played a “significant role in” 
and “where the NRC generally cannot devolve its responsibilities to the 
States.”32 Additionally, the Court noted that “because § 2021 classifie[d] 
the construction of nuclear power plants as one of the core remaining areas 
of special federal concern, any state law regulating that activity risks being 
 
21.  Id. at 1903.  
22. The court restated subsection (k) which reads, “Nothing in [§ 2021] 
shall be construed to affect the authority of any State or local agency to regulate 
activities for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards.” Id. at 1902 
(emphasis removed) (citing 42 U.S.C § 2021(k)).  
23. Id. at 1903.  
24. Id. 
25. Id.   
26.  461 U.S. 190 (1983). 
27.  Virginia Uranium, 129 S. Ct. at 1903–04.  
28. Id. at 1904 (citing Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 205).   
29. Id.  
30. Id. (citing Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 205).   
31.  Id. (citing Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 205, 209, 210).  
32. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C § 2021(c); see Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 197–98, 
206–07). 
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subject to an inquiry into its purposes under subsection (k).”33 On the other 
hand, the Virginia law regulated mining on private land, which is not 
mentioned under the AEA, and thus the Court found judicial inquiry was 
not authorized.34 
Nevertheless, the Court addressed a “wrinkle” which Virginia 
Uranium argued should impact the analysis.35 In Pacific Gas, the Court 
considered the legislative purpose behind the challenged law, and thus 
Virginia Uranium claimed it should do the same for the Virginia statute.36 
However, the Court disagreed, stating that the cases were distinguishable. 
Pacific Gas involved state laws that came close to infringing on federal 
powers, while the Virginia statute involved authority historically removed 
from the NRC.37 The Court further stated that the “preemption of state 
laws represents ‘a serious intrusion into state sovereignty.’”38 In the 
Court’s view, ordering preemption on such a “questionable judicial gloss” 
would represent “significant judicial intrusion into state sovereignty” and 
“significant judicial intrusion into Congress’s authority to delimit the 
preemptive effect of its laws.”39 The Court noted that in a case decided 
after Pacific Gas it did not “inquire in state legislative purposes” with 
respect to the purposed preemption of state tort law, because state tort law 
was outside of the NRC’s authority under the AEA.40 Also, in English v. 
General Electric Company,41 “[the Court] went further still, casting doubt 
on whether an inquiry into state legislative purposes had been either 
necessary or appropriate in Pacific Gas itself.”42 Finally, the Court noted 
that Pacific Gas warned against diving into inquiries of state legislative 
intent, as these are frequently “’unsatisfactory ventures.’”43 
 
C.  The AEA Did Not Displace State Law Through Conflict Preemption  
 
Virginia Uranium additionally claimed that the AEA displaced 
state law through conflict preemption.44 Virginia Uranium averred that 
“Virginia’s mining law stands as an impermissible ‘obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.’”45 Specifically, Virginia Uranium argued that the 
 
33.  Virginia Uranium, 129 S. Ct. at 1903; see 42 U.S.C § 2021(k)).  
34. Virginia Uranium, 129 S. Ct. at 1903; see 42 U.S.C § 2021(k)).  
35. Virginia Uranium, 129 S. Ct. at 1903. 
36. Id.  
37. Id.  
38. Id. (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 488 (1996) 
(plurality opinion)).  
39. Id. at 1905 (“This Court’s later cases confirm the propriety of restraint 
in this area.”).  
40. Id.; see Silkwood v. Kerr-Mcgee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984).   
41. 496 U.S. 72 (1990).  
42. Virginia Uranium, 129 S. Ct. at 1905 (citing English, 496 U.S. at 84–
85 n.7)  
43. Id. at 1907 (citing Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 216).  
44. Id.  
45. Id. (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).  
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Commonwealth’s ban on uranium mining disrupted the “balance” that 
Congress attempted to strike through the AEA between environmental and 
safety costs and the utilization of nuclear power.46  
The Court noted, however, that “only federal laws ‘made in 
pursuance of’ the bicameralism and presentment, are entitled to 
preemptive effect.”47 Evidence that a statute has an expressed or implied 
pre-emptive purpose must be found in the statute’s text and structure.48 
Additionally, the Court warned that complex problems arise when 
attempting “to ascribe unenacted purposes and objectives to a federal 
statute.”49 Legislative compromises could go unnoticed and “perfectly 
legitimate” laws may be overturned “on the strength of ‘purposes’ that 
only we can see.”50 Ultimately, the Court stated that the only thing it can 
be sure of is “what can be found in the law itself.”51 Based on the statutes 
at hand, the Court concluded that “Congress elected to leaving mining 




 In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Breyer and 
Alito, argued that the Court did not address the actual question of whether 
a state can regulate a non-preempted field as a means of regulating fields 
that are preempted.53 The dissent averred that the crux of the issue was 
whether the Commonwealth implemented the ban on uranium mining as a 
means to ban the steps that follow mining, such as milling and storing 
tailings.54 Furthermore, preemption is required if a state law’s purpose “is 
to regulate within a preempted field.”55 Thus, the dissent argued that an 
inquiry into Virginia’s legislative intent was necessary under the statute 
and precedent.56 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
 
46. Id.  
47. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. ART. VI, CL. 2; Puerto Rico Dept. of Consumer 
Affairs v. ISLA Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S 495, 503 (1988)).  
48. Id. (citing CSX Transp., Inc v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 
(1993)).   
49. Id.  
50. Id. at 1908. 
51. Id. 
52.  Id. 
53. Id. at 1916. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Sotomayor and 
Kagan, wrote a concurrence in which they stated agreement with most of the opinion 
but did not believe the Court should have discussed the issue of legislative intent. Id. 
at 1909. 
54. Id. at 1916. 
55. Id. (citing Pac Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. 
Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 212–13 (1983)). 
56. Id. at 1920.   
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 Virginia Uranium demonstrated how the Court will review a 
claim regarding preemption of state law by the AEA. As it stands, the AEA 
does not preempt state law in areas that are specifically not under the 
authority of the NRC and not involved in nuclear safety. The Court made 
clear that it will not decipher the purposed preemptive effect of a statute 
without the existence of sound evidence—in the text and structure of the 
statute—to suggest that Congress intended for preemptive effect. Thus, for 
now, state laws that ban uranium mining on private lands are secure. 
However, as the Court articulated, the decision does not mean the land 
could not be mined; the federal government would just have to acquire the 
property by purchase or eminent domain. 
